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1. Introduction 
 
Irregular immigration is not a new phenomenon. However, the flow of irregular immigrants1 
seeking a better life has been growing constantly in the past years.2 From a human rights 
perspective,3 regardless of the fact that they have formally breached immigration laws, these 
immigrants, as all human beings, have rights. Yet, the exact content and scope of these rights 
are not well understood. Part of the problem arguably lies in the general perception of irregular 
immigrants as individuals who are appropriately deprived of – or at least less entitled to – 
human rights. International courts and specifically regional human rights courts have an 
important role to play in shaping the content and scope of rights applicable to irregular 
immigrants. Their jurisprudence can considerably support a general recognition of human 
rights for migrants, including those in irregular situations regarding immigration laws.  
In this sense, as suggested by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) “seems far more inclined to push for the recognition of migrants’ 
rights”.4 The Court has indeed pushed the boundaries of its pro-homine approach5 to the realm 
of international migration. Interestingly, the Court’s proactive position was not limited to 
refugees; it has also considered the protection of rights of irregular immigrants as falling within 
its sphere of competence.6 As a result, the Court has placed itself at the forefront of a renewed 
approach to immigration via the recognition of irregular immigrants’ human rights. It 
                                                          
1   An irregular immigrant is understood as “a person who owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of 
entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country” as per International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), Glossary on Migration, available at: https://www.iom.int/key-migration-
terms (last visited 24 Aug. 2015). 
2   IOM, International Migration Outlook, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Publishing, 2013, available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-
health/international-migration-outlook-2013_migr_outlook-2013-en (last visited 24 Aug. 2015); IOM, 
International Migration Outlook, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2014, available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/els/international-migration-outlook-1999124x.htm (last visited 24 Aug. 2015); the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), “Mediterranean Crisis 2015 at six months: refugee 
and migrant numbers highest on record”, press release available at: http://www.unhcr.org/5592b9b36.html 
(last visited 24 Aug. 2015); J.A. Baer, “Documenting the Undocumented within Latin America”, Council on 
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 2014, available at:  http://www.coha.org/documenting-the-undocumented-
within-latin-america/ (last visited 24 Aug. 2015).  
3   See M-B. Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants. Study of the European Court of Human Rights with an 
Inter-American Counterpoint, Oxford, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2015, at 4 (discussing the implications 
of a human rights-based approach to migration); M-B. Dembour, “What are Human Rights? Four Schools of 
Thought”, Human Rights Quarterly, 32(1), 2010, 1–20 (proposing a framework of analysis based on four 
human rights schools of thought, namely natural law school, deliberative school, protest school, and discourse 
school).  
4    M-B. Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants, above footnote 3, at 1. 
5    Ibid., at 6. 
6 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18, the IACtHR Series 
A No. 18 (17 Sep. 2003) (hereafter referred to as the “Advisory Opinion OC-18”). 
recognized that the right to non-discrimination and to equality of treatment, 7 as well as the 
right to a due process8 and the minimum guarantees in case of detention9 and expulsion,10 also 
apply to irregular immigrants. 
This article aims to reassess and clarify the contribution of the IACtHR to the protection of 
irregular immigrants’ rights in Latin America.11 It aims to investigate whether the IACtHR has 
the capability to promote an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights in 
Latin America12 and whether this protection can be deemed effective and efficient. It also seeks 
to clarify to what extent the principles developed by the Inter-American jurisprudence have the 
potential to have an impact on jurisdictions outside Latin America.13  
                                                          
7 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6 at para. 110; Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of 
Migration and/or in need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, the IACtHR (19 Aug. 2014) 
(hereafter referred to as the “Advisory Opinion OC-21”) at para. 113; Dozerma v. Dominican Republic (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) the IACtHR (24 Oct. 2012) at para. 159; Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. 
Dominican Republic (Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) the IACtHR (28 Aug. 2014) at para. 402. 
8 Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, above footnote 7 at para. 397; Velez Loor v. 
Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) the IACtHR (23 Nov. 2010) at para. 139. 
9 Velez Loor v. Panama (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) the IACtHR (23 Nov. 2010) at 
paras. 221–245. 
10 Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic above footnote 7, at para. 398; Dozerma v. 
Dominican Republic, above footnote 7 at paras. 152–167. 
11  The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, although remarkable, does not fall 
within the scope of this article. The IACtHR’s jurisprudence constitutes the primary focus of this study. See (for 
a detailed analysis of the role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) R.K. Goldman, “History and 
Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights”, 31(4), Human Rights Quarterly, 2009, 856–887; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Migrants, decisions of the Inter-American Commission available at:  
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/migrants/decisions/iachr.asp (last visited 24 Aug. 2015) (for a detailed list of 
decisions in the field of migrants’ rights). 
12 The protection of refugees and asylum-seekers’ rights does not constitute the principal focus of this study and 
will only be considered with respect to the situations of “mixed flows”. According to the IOM, mixed flows are 
“complex population movements including refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants 
concerning irregular movements of population which do not have visas or necessary documentation and cross 
borders irregularly”: see the IOM, “Irregular Migration and Mixed Flows: IOM’s Approach”, 19 Oct. 2009, 
MC/INF/297, available at: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/98/MC_INF_297.pdf (last 
visited 24 Aug. 2015). For an extensive analysis of the Inter-American jurisprudence regarding refugees and 
asylum-seekers, see D.J. Cantor & S. Barichello, “The Inter-American Human Rights System: A New Model for 
Integrating Refugee and Complementary Protection?”, 17 International Journal of Human Rights, 17 2013, 689–
706; D.J. Cantor & S. Barichello, “Protection of Asylum-Seekers under the Inter-American Human Rights 
System” in A. Abass & F. Ippolito (eds), Regional Approaches to the Protection of Asylum-Seekers: An 
International Legal Perspective, London, Ashgate, 2014, 267. 
13 This article notably takes the European context for comparison. This choice is justified by the similarities 
between the IACtHR and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to irregular 
immigrants and by the scarcity of decisions and mechanisms of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights in other 
regional systems of protection of human rights. However (for a general overview of the protection of human rights 
in cases of deportation in the context of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights) see: African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR), Institute for Human Rights and Development in 
Africa (on behalf of Mr Esmaila Connateh and 13 others) v. Republic of Angola, (Communication No. 292/2004), 
43rd Ordinary Session, 7–22 May 2008, at para. 84; ACommHPR, Good v. Republic of Botswana 
(Communication No. 313/05), 47th Ordinary Session, May 2010, at para. 13; See also (for general information 
about the “Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons 
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In order to achieve the principal objective of this article, the political and institutional 
framework of the Inter-American system of human rights will be examined in the second 
section. It is argued that the peculiar political context of Latin American countries has, 
surprisingly, favourably shaped the construction of the Inter-American system. The third 
section investigates the extent and significance of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in the field 
of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. The impact of this jurisprudence within and 
outside the Inter-American sphere is critically analysed. The fourth section examines whether, 
despite its progressive character, the IACtHR still faces important obstacles, in particular with 
respect to compliance with judicial decisions and the effectiveness of the protection of rights. 
The analysis of these challenges is not purely legal or institutional, but also refers to the Latin 
American cultural, political, and societal context, as compliance and effectiveness of rights 
appear to be strongly related to these general considerations. Finally, the article draws 
conclusions on the actual relevance of the IACtHR’s general contribution to the protection of 
irregular immigrants’ rights. 
2. A peculiar political and institutional framework 
 
Prior to examining the content and scope of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights by 
the IACtHR, it is important to understand the context of the creation and development of this 
court within the Inter-American human rights system. It is suggested that the particularities of 
the Latin American continent have an impact on the recognition and effectiveness of the 
protection of human rights, including those of irregular immigrants. 
Since its creation in 1948,14 the Inter-American human rights system has evolved against 
the backdrop of many brutal dictatorial Latin American regimes engaged in systematic 
violations of human rights.15 One of its readily apparent paradoxes is that many of its founding 
                                                          
established in the context of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights”), available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons/ (last visited 24 Aug. 2015). 
14 The Organization of American States (OAS) was established with the adoption of its Charter on 30 Apr. 1948. 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) was adopted by the OAS Member States 
in 1948.  
15 See E. Lutz & K. Sikkink, “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America”, International 
Organization, 54(3), 2000, 633–659, at 637; E. Lutz and K. Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and 
Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America”, Chinese Journal of International Law 2, 2001, 1–34, 
at 3; D. Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone”, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 16(1), 1994, 105–130, at 106; L. Burgorgue-Larsen, “Les nouvelles tendances dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme” Curso de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones 
Internacionales de Vitoria-Gasteiz Universidad del Pais Vasco, Bilbao, 2009, 149, at 149. 
States had been ruled by oppressive dictatorships.16 Consequently, one may consider it 
essential to establish why American States were inclined to, first, adopt international 
instruments on the protection of human rights, establish institutions with the competence to 
monitor the implementation of these instruments, and, finally, fund the functioning of the 
whole system.  
Historically, American States fought for the proclamation of human rights in the aftermath 
of the Second World War.17 Since April 1948, American States not only decided to create an 
international organization, the Organization of American States (OAS), by adopting a 
constitutive Charter,18 but also adopted a declaration of rights, the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM).19 The ADRDM, therefore, precedes the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by a few months.20 The OAS later adopted the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) during the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica, on 21 November 1969.21 The ACHR 
entered into force on the 18 July 1978 and is today the main regional instrument for the 
protection of human rights in the Americas. Only 23 of the 35 OAS Member States have ratified 
the Convention, with the United States (US) and Canada notably among those States refusing 
to ratify it.22 The ACHR has been complemented by the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol 
of San Salvador),23 and the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish 
the Death Penalty.24 
In a similar way to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the ACHR sets 
forth mainly civil and political rights.25 Unlike the ECHR, the ACHR explicitly provides for 
                                                          
16 See S. Mainwaring, D. Brinks & A. Perez-Linan, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945–2004”, 
in G.L. Munck (ed.), Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods, Oxford, OUP, 2007, 123. 
17 Goldman, “History and Action”, above footnote 11, 859. 
18 Charter of the OAS, 119 UNTS 3. 
19 ADRDM, Res XXX, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OAS/Ser L V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 17 
(1992). 
20 The UDHR was adopted on 10 Dec. 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III), art 5. 
21 The OAS ACHR, 22 Nov. 1969, 1144 UNTS 123. 
22 See the OAS website for information on membership of the ACHR, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited 12 
August 2015). 
23 Opened for signatures by the General Assembly of the OAS during its 18th regular session in 1988. 
24 Approved by the General Assembly of the OAS in its 20th regular session in 1990. 
25 Including the right to life (art. 4 ACHR; art. 2 ECHR), freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment 
(art. 5 ACHR; art. 3 ECHR), freedom from slavery (art. 6 ACHR; art. 4 ECHR), right to a fair trial (art. 8 ACHR; 
art. 6 ECHR), and right to privacy (art. 11 ACHR; art. 8 ECHR). 
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freedom of association for labour purposes26 and also encompasses a progressive development 
clause, according to which the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights is to be 
progressively achieved by the Member States.27 In the field of aliens’ rights, unlike the ECHR, 
the ACHR expressly provides for “the right to seek and be granted asylum”,28 thereby codifying 
this right in the Inter-American system.29 Both the ECHR and ACHR contain provisions 
relating to procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens lawfully staying in the territory 
of a State party to the Convention,30 and to the protection against collective expulsions of 
aliens.31 In addition, in the European sphere, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has developed a form of indirect protection (protection par ricochet)32 of aliens’ rights in cases 
of the existence of serious risk of violation of human rights in the context of expulsion, 
deportation or extradition.33  
In contrast, the Inter-American system of human rights is twofold: it comprises the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as ‘the Inter-American 
Commission’ or ‘the Commission’),34 created by the OAS in 1959, and the IACtHR, 
established in 1979. The IACtHR has two main functions – adjudicatory and advisory. 
Regarding its adjudicatory competence, it should be noted that Member States shall accept the 
Court’s contentious jurisdiction at the time of ratification or at any time thereafter.35 There is 
                                                          
26 Art. 16 (1) ACHR. The ECtHR has, however, decided that “the right to form and to join trade unions is a special 
aspect of freedom of association” provided for by art. 11 ECHR, even though this article does not explicitly say 
so: Young, James and Webster v. UK App no. 7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECHR, 13 Aug. 1981) at para. 52; Sigurdur 
A Sirgurjonsson v. Iceland App no. 16130/90 (ECHR, 30 Jun..1993) at para. 35; Gustafsson v. Sweden App no. 
15573/89 (ECHR, 25 Apr. 1996) at para. 45; Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark App nos 52562/99 and 
52620/99 (ECHR, 11 Jan. 2006) at para. 54. 
27 Art. 26 ACHR. 
28 Art. 22(7) ACHR. 
29 Art. 22(8) ACHR which is similar to the provision of article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees. See D.J. Cantor & S. Barichello, “The Inter-American human rights system”, above footnote 
10, at 695 (arguing that the ACHR is influenced directly by the provisions of international refugee law). See also 
Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) IACtHR (25 Nov. 2013) at para. 
128 (the first decision of the IACtHR relating to right of asylum in which it is decided that the motivation and 
form used by the applicant for applying for asylum cannot be used by a State to deny the right to a fair trial to the 
applicant).  
30 Art. 22(6) and (9) ACHR; art. 1 Protocol 7 ECHR. 
31 Art. 22 (9) ACHR; art. 4 Protocol 4 ECHR. 
32 F. Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme, Paris, PUF, 2011, at 662. 
33 See notably Soering v. UK App no. 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 Jul. 1989); Chahal v. United Kingdom App no. 2414/93 
(ECtHR, 15 Nov. 1996); Jabari v. Turkey Application no. 40035/98 (ECtHR, 11 Jul. 2000); Othman (Abu Qatada) 
v. UK Application no. 8139/09 (ECtHR, 17 Jan. 2012). See M-B. Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants, 
above footnote 3, at 112. 
34 According to Article 41 of the ACHR, the Inter-American Commission can receive individual petitions, and 
monitor the situation of human rights in Member States and in relation to thematic areas. See generally Goldman, 
“History and Action”, above footnote 11.  
35 Art 62(1) ACHR; L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Case Law and Commentary, Oxford, OUP, 2011, at 9.  
no direct contentious mechanism under the Inter-American system.36 Individuals can submit 
allegations of human rights violations to the Inter-American Commission, which will examine 
the case and decide on the admissibility and on the merits;37 it may also propose friendly 
settlements.38 Only the Inter-American Commission, and more rarely States,39 can submit a 
report initiating the case before the IACtHR, requesting the Court’s decision.40 The Inter-
American Commission tends, however, to systematically refer cases to the Court when the 
State in question has accepted its jurisdiction.41 In its advisory competence, the IACtHR has 
adopted influential opinions throughout the years, notably in the field of the protection of 
aliens’ rights.42  
At the time of the creation of the Inter-American system of human rights, the biggest 
challenges were related to the omnipresence of dictatorial military regimes notorious for their 
serious and widespread human rights violations. The situation in the 21st century has changed. 
With a few exceptions, such as Cuba, Latin American countries have engaged in extensive 
democratization and are trying to overcome the horror of the dictatorship period.43 However, 
other problems have followed, such as endemic corruption,44 emergence of mafias and 
uncontrollable organized crime,45 and social inequality.46 In other words, Latin America is still 
                                                          
36 In this sense it resembles the ECHR mechanism prior to the entry into force of Additional Protocol No. 11 in 
1998. See R. Bernhardt, “Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Protocol No. 11”, American Journal of International Law, 89, 1995, 145–154, at 145. 
37 Arts. 44–47 ACHR. 
38 Art. 48(1) ACHR. 
39 Art. 51(1) ACHR; L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 36, at 29. 
40 Art. 50 ACHR. 
41 Art. 45(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights states: “If the State 
in question has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in accordance with Article 62 of the 
American Convention, and the Commission considers that the State has not complied with the recommendations 
of the report approved in accordance with Article 50 of the American Convention, it shall refer the case to the 
Court, unless there is a reasoned decision by an absolute majority of the members of the Commission to the 
contrary.” 
42 For example, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due 
Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16, IACtHR Series A No. 16 (1 Oct. 1999) (hereafter referred to as the 
“Advisory Opinion OC-16”); Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6; Rights and Guarantees of Children in 
the Context of Migration and/or in need of International Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-21, above footnote 7. 
43 Notably via the establishment of Truth Commissions. See J. Pasqualucci, “The Whole Truth and Nothing But 
the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System”, Boston University 
International Law Journal, 12, 1995, 321. 
44 See generally K. Weiland, “The Politics of Corruption in Latin America”, Journal of Democracy, 9(2), 1998, 
108–121; J.M. Ruhl, “Political Corruption in Central America: Assessment and Explanation”, Latin American 
Politics and Society, 53, 2011, 33–58.  
45 See generally B. Bagley, “Globalisation and Latin American and Caribbean Organised Crime” 6 Global Crime, 
6 (1), 2004, 32–53; J. Bailey & M. Taylor, “Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil 
and Mexico”, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1(2), 2009, 3–29.  
46 See K. Hofmann & M.A. Centeno, “The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin America”, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 29, 2003, 363–390. 
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plagued by rampant violations of human rights. These are all issues which the IACtHR needs 
to take into account when imposing respect for human rights in the Latin American region, 
including respect for aliens’ rights. 
 
3. The establishment of a significant jurisprudence on the protection of irregular 
immigrants’ rights 
The IACtHR developed an important line of decisions relating to the protection of irregular 
immigrants’ rights. Its origins can be traced back to the Advisory Opinion OC-18,47 which 
relied to a large extent on the concept of jus cogens. Despite its disputable legal basis (Section 
3.1), this Advisory Opinion is considered an influential authority in the field, as it is fairly 
invoked both within and outside the Inter-American system (Section 3.2). This was followed 
by a continuous development of the IACtHR’s jurisprudence in the field, notably lying in the 
recognition of irregular immigrants’ vulnerability (Section 3.3). As a result, the IACtHR was 
able to impose an ambitious and diverse range of obligations upon States (Section 3.4). 
3.1.  A controversial starting point: the Advisory Opinion OC-18 
The IACtHR was not oblivious to the situation of irregular immigrants in the Americas. On the 
contrary, it acknowledged the difficulties endured by economic immigrants in search of better 
life conditions in Advisory Opinion OC-18.48 The IACtHR considered that: 
[…] undocumented migrant workers, who are in a situation of vulnerability and 
discrimination with regard to national workers, possess the same labor rights as those that 
correspond to other workers of the State of employment, and the latter must take all 
necessary measures to ensure that such rights are recognized and guaranteed in practice.49 
 
                                                          
47 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6. 
48 Already in his concurring opinion to the Advisory Opinion OC-16 of 1 Oct. 1999, Judge Cançado Trindade 
expressed his concerns about the “condition of particular vulnerability” that aliens experience and reaffirmed these 
concerns in his concurring opinion to the Advisory Opinion OC-18. At the same time, Judge García Ramírez 
expressed his sympathy with immigrants who “are very often almost totally helpless, owing to their lack of social, 
economic and cultural knowledge of the country in which they work, and to the lack of instruments to protect 
their rights”. See: Advisory Opinion OC-16, above footnote 42 (Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade) at para. 23; Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6 (Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade) at para. 14; Ibid., Reasoned Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez, at para. 9. 
49 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 160. 
As emphasized by Beth Lyon, “in OC-18, the IACtHR substantially altered the definition 
of rights of unauthorized workers in the Americas”.50 In this Advisory Opinion, the IACtHR 
indeed ruled that although Member States can control the entry of, and deny work permits to, 
immigrants, once these persons are physically present in their territory and once a working 
relationship (even illegal) has been established, they are entitled to “labour human rights”.51  
The Court found the justification for such an affirmation in the application of the principle 
of equality and non-discrimination to irregular immigrant workers. According to the Court, this 
principle “belongs to the realm of jus cogens and is of a peremptory character, [and it] entails 
obligations erga omnes of protection that bind all States and give rise to effects with regard to 
third parties, including individuals”.52 In order to reach this conclusion, the Court built upon 
the principle of human dignity and the general obligation to respect and guarantee human 
rights.53  
The Court’s legal arguments are not, however, fully convincing. Three main points can be 
challenged: the use of the concept of jus cogens, the recognition of obligations erga omnes, 
and the imposition of horizontal obligations by the Court. 
3.1.1. The use of the concept of jus cogens 
The IACtHR seems to misuse the concept of jus cogens while applying it to all situations 
related to the prohibition of discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality.54 Peremptory norms or norms of jus cogens “are rules of customary law that cannot 
be set aside by treaty or by acquiescence but only through the formation of a subsequent 
customary rule of the same character”.55 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) provides for a legal basis for these norms. It states: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm 
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
                                                          
50 B. Lyon, “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines Unauthorized Migrant Workers’ Rights for the 
Hemisphere: A Comment on Advisory Opinion 18”, New York University Review of Law & Social Change, 28, 
2004, 547, at 595. 
51 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 133. 
52 Ibid., at para. 110. 
53 In the Inter-American system this obligation is enshrined in arts. 1 and 2 ACHR. 
54 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 100. 
55 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2012, at 594. 
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which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character. 
In order to qualify the principle of non-discrimination as jus cogens, it would be necessary to 
show that this characterization is “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole”.56 The IACtHR drew upon the nature of the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, which it considered as “fundamental for the safeguard of human rights in both 
international and domestic law”.57 It held that “[t]he principle of equality before the law and 
non-discrimination permeates every act of the powers of the State, in all their manifestations, 
related to respecting and ensuring human rights”.58 The Court did not offer more detailed 
evidence of the supposed acceptance by the international community of non-discrimination as 
a peremptory norm of international law. It imposed, however, its own interpretation of 
international human rights law, in all likelihood inspired by the positions adopted by Judge 
Cançado Trindade, then President of the IACtHR.59 
As pointed out by Andrea Bianchi, “reference to jus cogens may have been instrumental in 
reaching out to the United States, not a party to the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights”.60 It is indeed interesting to note that the request for advisory opinion was formulated 
in very general terms by Mexico, without any specific reference to the US.61 However, the 
Mexican demand implicitly related to the situation of undocumented Mexican immigrant 
workers in the US and the outcome of the US Supreme Court decision of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds v. NLRB.62 In this decision the US Supreme Court held that undocumented 
immigrants were not entitled to back pay under domestic law in cases of dismissal motivated 
by the participation in trade union activities.63 The IACtHR, on the contrary, held that these 
                                                          
56 Art. 53 VCLT. See A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2006; G.I. 
Hernandez, “A Reluctant Guardian: The International Court of Justice and the Concept of ‘International 
Community’”, The British Yearbook of International Law, 84(1), 2013, 13–60, at 37–57.  
57 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 88. 
58 Ibid., at para. 100. 
59 See Judge Cançado Trindade’s views on the notion of jus cogens: A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Jus Cogens: The 
Determination and the Gradual Expansion of its Material Content in Contemporary International Case-Law”, 
available at: <www.oas.org/dil/esp/3%20-%20cancado.LR.CV.3-30.pdf> (last visited 24 Aug. 2015); A.A. 
Cançado Trindade, “Uprootedness and the Protection of Migrants in the International Law of Human Rights”, 
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 51, 2008, 137–168. 
60 A. Bianchi, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens”, European Journal of International Law, 19(3), 
2008, 491–508, at 506. 
61 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at paras. 1–4.  
62 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 535 US 137 (2002). For an analysis of the implications of this decision 
see B. Lyon, “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, above footnote 50, at 560–570. 
63 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB 535 US 137 (2002) at 14. 
undocumented immigrant workers have rights arising from their employment.64 Importantly, 
one of the consequences of the IACtHR’s analysis is that these rights could also be evoked 
before US courts given that under this view, they are based on jus cogens norms and not on 
treaty-based provisions.65 
3.1.2. The recognition of obligations erga omnes 
The recognition of the erga omnes character of the norm can also be questioned. It follows 
from the IACtHR’s reasoning that the general principle of equality, entailing a general 
obligation by States to respect and protect human rights without discrimination, has crystalized 
as a peremptory norm of international law or jus cogens.66 The next step in its reasoning 
consisted of deducing that this general principle of equality, as per its nature, also generates 
obligations towards the international community as a whole, in other words, erga omnes 
obligations.67 Accordingly, the Court affirmed that “the general obligation to respect and 
ensure the exercise of rights has an erga omnes character”.68 Once more, the Court gave little 
evidence to support this statement,69 which, in addition, did not contribute to the clarification 
of the ongoing doctrinal debate around the relationship between the concept of jus cogens and 
the imposition of erga omnes obligations.70 
It is true that in the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) referred 
to the prohibition of racial discrimination as encompassing an erga omnes obligation.71 It has 
indeed held that “the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
                                                          
64 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 134. 
65 However, the use of jus cogens norms in US domestic litigation is still a matter of dispute. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 732 (2004) (recognizing that international norms must be specific, 
universal and obligatory to be evoked in domestic litigation); Sarei et al v. Rio Tinto Plc et al, No. 02-56256, 
F.3d, 19321, 19333 (9th US Circuit Court of Appeals, 2011) (concluding that claims of crimes against humanity 
arising from a blockade and racial discrimination claims do not fall within the limited federal jurisdiction created 
by the US Alien Tort Statute); Kiobel et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al. 569 US slip op. at 14 (2013) 
(concluding that even where claims based on the application of international law touch and concern the territory 
of the US, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application). 
66 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 100. 
67 Ibid., at para. 109. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at paras. 109–110. 
70 See C. J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press (CUP), 2005, at 146–149; A. Bianchi, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens”, above footnote 60, at 
502; G. Neuman, “Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, 
European Journal of International Law, 19(1), 2008, 101–123; at 121; M. Byers, “Conceptualizing the 
Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 66, 1997, 211–
239, at 229; E. de Wet, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law, Oxford, OUP, 2013, 541–561.  
71 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) [1979] ICJ Rep 3, 32, at para. 34. 
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including protection from slavery and racial discrimination” were to be considered as imposing 
erga omnes obligations.72 The ICJ’s statement with regard to the erga omnes status of the 
prohibition of racial discrimination has been generally accepted and can be considered correct 
as a matter of law.73 Nonetheless, it is still debatable whether non-discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality – a much broader principle in its scope – may be considered as 
amounting to such an obligation.74  
There are a number of reasons for this scepticism. States can impose their own rules 
governing the attribution and acquisition of nationality.75 States can also impose rules regarding 
the entry, residence and expulsion of foreigners.76 In addition, differences in treatment may be 
justified insofar as the individual behaviour of the foreigner constitutes a serious threat to 
public order, national security or public health.77 In order to be justified, the difference in the 
treatment of a foreigner entailing interference with his rights must be provided by law, pursue 
a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society.78 Accordingly, a difference of 
treatment based on the nationality of the individual may be justified, whereas a difference of 
treatment exclusively based on the race of an individual would not be objectively justified in a 
contemporary, democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different 
cultures.79 Therefore, it would appear that the erga omnes nature of the prohibition of racial 
discrimination does not extend to the prohibition of discrimination in general or even to the 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
 
 
3.1.3. The imposition of horizontal obligations  
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 See, e.g. M. Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Oxford, OUP, 2000, at 119–131; 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), in 
Yearbook of the ILC, 2001, vol II, part two, at 127, commentary to art 48, at para. 9; C. J. Tams, Enforcing 
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2005, at 117–118. 
74 Crawford, above footnote 59, at 645. 
75 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase), [1955] ICJ Rep. 4, at para. 23. 
76 Chahal v. UK, above footnote 33, at para. 73; Saadi v. UK App no. 13229/03 (ECHR, 29 Jan. 2008) at para. 44; 
Suso Musa v. Malta App no. 42337/12 (ECHR, 23 Jul. 2013) at para. 90. 
77 Chahal v. UK, above footnote 33, at para. 76; Boultif v. Switzerland App no. 54273/00 (ECHR, 2 Aug. 2001) 
at para. 46; Üner v. The Netherlands App no. 46410/99 (ECHR, 18 Oct. 2006) at para. 54. 
78 Gaygusuz v. Austria App no. 17371/90 (ECHR, 16 Sep. 1996) at para. 42. 
79 Timishev v. Russia App no. 55762/00 and 55974/00 (ECHR, 13 Dec. 2005) at para. 58; D.H. and others v. The 
Czech Republic App no. 57325/00 (ECHR, 13 Nov. 2007) at para. 176. 
Finally, the horizontal effect of this norm, as adopted by the IACtHR in its Advisory Opinion 
OC-18,80 may also be questioned.  
In principle, a norm which is ordinarily destined to produce legal effects between the State 
and the individual (vertical relationship) may also apply to situations where both parties are 
individuals (horizontal relationship). Accordingly, this norm will create obligations and engage 
the responsibility of individuals, even though it was not ordinarily designed to apply to these 
situations. This is the case with regards to certain provisions established by international 
treaties relating to the protection of human rights. In principle, these provisions should only 
engage the State parties to the international treaty. However, because of the nature of the 
obligations and rights contained in these provisions, they may also produce effects vis-à-vis 
purely private situations (between two or more individuals).81  
For instance, inspired by the German theory of Drittwirkung,82 the ECtHR has, recognized 
the possibility of the effect of certain ECHR provisions vis-à-vis individuals.83 When the 
interference with a right guaranteed by the ECHR is not directly attributable to the State but 
follows from an action or omission of a third party (a legal person or a natural person), the 
responsibility of the State can be still be engaged in certain circumstances. Two main situations 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, international responsibility of a State may be engaged 
because of its inaction which had in turn enabled the breach of an ECHR provision by a third 
party. One example of this is the case of pollution caused by a private company because of the 
construction of a waste-treatment plant allowed by the State, even though the company failed 
to fulfil all the legal requirements such as obtaining a municipal licence.84 On the other hand, 
a State may be internationally responsible because its domestic law rendered the breach of the 
ECHR possible. One example of this is the case of dismissal of employees who failed to comply 
with the condition of mandatory membership to a trade union provided by a closed-shop 
agreement.85 The basis of the State responsibility in the European system also arises out of the 
general obligation to respect human rights. However, in the European system, this obligation 
                                                          
80  Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 110. 
81 See J.H. Knox, “Horizontal Human Rights Law”, American Journal of International Law, 102(1), 2008, 1–47; 
Eric Engle, “Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung)”, Hanse Law Review, 5(2), 2009, 165–173. 
See in the context of comparative constitutional law S. Gardbaum, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional 
Rights”, Michigan Law Review, 102(3), 2003, 387–459.  
82 Lüth Case7BVerfGE 198 (1958); D.P. Kommers and R.A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Federal 
Republic of Germany (2012), at 60–61.  
83 Young, James and Webster v. UK App no. 7601/76 and 7806/77 (ECHR, 13 Aug. 1981).  
84 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App no. 16798/90 (ECHR, 9 Dec. 1994), at paras. 52–56. 
85 Young, James and Webster v. UK, above footnote 83, at para. 54. 
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is provided for by Article 1 of the ECHR. The 47 Member States of the Council of Europe have 
ratified the ECHR (and by doing so, they have also recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR).  
This is not the case in the Inter-American system. The IACtHR affirmed in Advisory 
Opinion OC-18 that the obligation to respect human rights without discrimination gives rise to 
“effects with regard to third parties, including individuals”.86 In the context of the Advisory 
Opinion, this affirmation seems to arise out of the sole recognition by the IACtHR of this norm 
as jus cogens.87 Peremptory norms of international law may under certain circumstances 
produce effects horizontally.88 However, it is important to note that unlike the ECtHR, the 
IACtHR relies solely on the concept of jus cogens and does not discuss the horizontal effect of 
treaty-based norms.89 As argued above, the use of the concept of jus cogens by the IACtHR in 
this Advisory Opinion is not supported by unquestionable evidence or authority, which 
weakens the recognition of the horizontal effect of this precise norm.90 
3.2. An interesting middle point: the impact of Advisory Opinion OC-18 within and outside the 
Inter-American system 
Advisory Opinion OC-18 has had some interesting, although modest, repercussions. As Sarah 
Cleveland pointed out, this Advisory Opinion has an important, persuasive authority that can 
serve as a powerful interpretive tool for domestic and international courts and organizations, 
scholars and decision-makers. 91 This has indeed been the case. 
In the Inter-American sphere, for example, the Inter-American Commission referred to 
Advisory Opinion OC-18 in the case of Margarita Cecilia Barberia Miranda v. Chile.92 This 
reference was not only formal, but constituted the basis of the reasoning of the Commission 
relating to the nationality requirement for the practice of law by attorneys in Chile. The Inter-
American Commission insisted that because non-discrimination is a peremptory norm of 
                                                          
86 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 110. 
87 Ibid. Which is comforted by the Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, paras.76–85 (notably 
para. 77). 
88  See C. J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, above footnote 70, at 146–149; A. 
Bianchi, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens”, above footnote 60, at 502. 
89 Despite citing articles 1 and 2 ACHR with regard to the general obligation to respect and guarantee human 
rights Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at paras. 70, 76, and 78. 
90 See above Section 3.1.1. 
91 S. Cleveland, “Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers: Advisory Opinion OC-18/03”, American 
Journal of International Law, 99(2), 2005, 460–465, at 464. 
92 Margarita Cecilia Barberia Miranda v. Chile (Merits) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 
no. 56/10 (18 Mar. 2010) at paras. 35–36. 
international law, States have a positive obligation to combat discrimination and to adopt all 
measures necessary to ensure equality before the law.93 Applying the technique of consensual 
interpretation,94 the Inter-American Commission arrived at the conclusion that the majority of 
OAS Member States did not require practising attorneys to have the nationality of the Member 
State in which they practise law.95 Consequently, it restrained Chile’s margin of appreciation 
and concluded that the State was responsible for the violation of the right to equal protection 
as a result of the application of a discriminatory norm that prevented the applicant from 
practising her profession “exclusively because she was a foreigner”.96 In Resolution 03/08 on 
Human Rights of Migrants, International Standards and the Return Directive of the EU, the 
Inter-American Commission went even further and “exhort[ed] the Parliament and the Council 
of the EU to modify the Directive (Returns)”.97 In order to reach this conclusion, the Inter-
American Commission based its legal analysis on the obligation of respect of human rights 
without discrimination.98 It again explicitly referred to the IACtHR’s Advisory Opinion OC-
18.99 
The effects of Advisory Opinion OC-18 have also been felt across the Atlantic. In Souza 
Ribeiro v. France, a case about the expulsion of an undocumented Brazilian immigrant, two 
                                                          
93 Ibid., at para. 36. 
94 The technique of consensual interpretation consists of examining whether member States to an international 
treaty on human rights have the same position (legislations and policies) in a particular subject. If Member States 
have similar consistent positions, their margin of appreciation to implement an obligation arising out of the treaty 
is deemed to be less important. Conversely, Member States’ margin of appreciation is supposedly more extended 
in cases where they do not have similar positions in a particular subject. The use of consensual interpretation by 
the IACtHR considerably resembles the application of consensual interpretation and the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation by the ECtHR. For a critical approach to the ECtHR’s use of consensual interpretation, see F. Sudre, 
Droit Européen et international des droits de l’homme, above footnote 32, at 235; F. Sudre, “A propos du 
dynamisme interprétatif de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, Juris-Classeur périodique – La Semaine 
Juridique, édition générale, 2001 I 335; G. Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 26(4), 2006, 705–732.  
95 Margarita Cecilia Barberia Miranda v. Chile, above footnote 92, at para. 37. 
96 Ibid., at para. 66. 
97 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 03/08 Human Rights of Migrants, International 
Standards and the Return Directive of the EU, 25 Jul. 2008, at 2. Naturally, the Inter-American Commission has 
no jurisdiction over European Union (EU) law and this resolution is not legally binding in the EU. In any 
circumstances, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the only judicial authority 
with powers to interpret EU law in the EU in relation to the Returns Directive, follows the same line of arguments 
proposed by the Inter-American Commission regarding guarantees of due process and immigration detention. In 
its two landmark decisions in the cases of El Dridi and Achughbabian, the CJEU has interpreted that the Returns 
Directive imposes immigration detention as a last resort measure which should not hinder or render less effective 
the removal of irregular immigrants from Member States. Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 Dec. 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals [2008] OJ L348. 
Case C-61/11/PPU Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim [2011] ECR I-3015 at paras. 34–41; Case C-329/11 A. 
Achughbabian v. Prefet du Val-de-Marne [2011] OJ C 32, 12 at para. 36. 
98 Ibid., at 1. 
99 Ibid., at 2. 
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judges of the ECtHR, Judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Vučinić, explicitly referred to the 
Advisory Opinion OC-18 in a separate opinion.100 In her partially dissenting opinion in 
Georgia v. Russia (I), Judge Tsotsoria similarly held that “the principle of respect for and 
protection of human rights on a non-discriminatory basis is recognized as an international legal 
standard. Prohibition of discrimination has crystallised into a jus cogens norm”.101 It is 
noteworthy that – in contrast to her fellow judges in the Souza Ribeiro case cited above – she 
did not expressly refer to Advisory Opinion OC-18 to support her position. 
Scholars have also commented a great deal on Advisory Opinion OC-18. Most of them have 
expressed critical views about the use of the concept of jus cogens by the IACtHR.102 Some 
have, however, taken it at face value and built upon it to develop their own positions on other 
subjects, such as the applicability of human rights between private parties,103 or ethnic 
cleansing.104 
Finally, certain Latin American States have acknowledged the importance of Advisory 
Opinion OC-18. In the request for an advisory opinion on migrant children presented by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay before the IACtHR,105 Advisory Opinion OC-18 is 
expressly mentioned.106 These States formally requested the IACtHR to: 
[T]ake into special consideration certain general principles of international human rights 
law, among others: […] the principle of non-discrimination, which prohibits unreasonable 
restrictions on fundamental rights owing to different factors, such as nationality or the 
immigration status of the person and which calls for the consideration of identifying 
features of the person, for instance, age, cultural background and gender.107 
                                                          
100 Souza Ribeiro v. France App no. 22689/07 (ECHR, 13 Dec. 2012) Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque joined by Judge Vučinić, at para. 12. 
101 Georgia v. Russia (I) App no. 13255/07 (merits) (ECHR, 3 Jul. 2014) Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Tsotsoria, at para. 18. 
102 For example, Bianchi, above footnote 60, at 506; Neuman, “Import, Export, and Regional Consent”, above 
footnote 70, at 117–122; G. Noll, “Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented Migrants”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 12, 2010, 241–272, at 261. 
103 C. Courtis “The Applicability of Human Rights Between Private Parties” in Y. Donders and V. Volodin (eds), 
Human Rights in Education, Science and Culture. Legal Developments and Challenges Paris/Aldershot, 
UNESCO/Ashgate, 2008, 153-182, at 156.  
104 S. Marmin, Le Nettoyage Ethnique. Aspects de Droit International, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2014, at 103. 
105 Institute for Public Policy in Human Rights “Request for Advisory Opinion on Migrant Children before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, 2011, available at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/solicitudoc/solicitud_eng.pdf (last visited 14 Jan. 2015). 
106 Ibid., at para. 13. 
107 Ibid. 
This reference is by no means anodyne; it could be seen as reflecting the common belief of 
these States about the nature and the content of the principle of non-discrimination. According 
to this request, the principle of non-discrimination encompasses the prohibition of 
discrimination not only on the grounds of nationality but also in relation to immigration 
status.108 This is tangible evidence of the impact of Advisory Opinion OC-18. The four 
founding States of Mercosur109 (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) recognized the 
existence of the very pro-immigrant jurisprudence of the IACtHR, which is remarkable; 
however, how they implement this jurisprudence in their domestic legal orders is another 
matter. These States acknowledged that there was a lack of legislation and public policies in 
this area. 110 Therefore, they seem to seek to obtain a sort of stamp of legitimacy for their own 
legislation and policies. They were certainly inviting the IACtHR to adopt a general position 
on a very sensitive and important question, also affecting States that are not party to the ACHR, 
such as the US.111 This is exactly what the IACtHR did. In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the 
Court recalls that its advisory function aims, “above all, to support the Member States and the 
organs of the OAS so that they are able to meet their relevant international obligations fully 
and effectively, and to define and implement public policies in the area of human rights”.112 
Accordingly, Member States may be willing to refer to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence to justify 
the need for new domestic legislation and policies in the field of immigration. States may also 
blame the Court for imposing these changes, which would just reinforce the common misuse 
of human rights in the political discourse. 
 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 Mercosur (“Southern Common Market” or “Mercado Común del Sur” in Spanish) is a customs union and free 
trade area between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Venezuela. Chile, Peru, Colombia, Equator, 
Guiana and Suriname are associated countries to the Mercosur. See http://www.mercosur.int/ (last visited 24 Aug. 
2015); E. Amann & W. Baer, “Market Integration Without Policy Integration: A Comparison of the Shortcomings 
of Mercosur and the Eurozone”, Latin American Business Review, 15 (3), 2014, 327–335, at 329; W. Baer & P. 
Silva, “Mercosul: Its Successes and Failures During Its First Two Decades”, Latin American Business Review, 15 
(3), 2014, 193–208, at 195 
110 Institute for Public Policy in Human Rights “Request for Advisory Opinion on Migrant Children before the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, above footnote 105, at para. 2. 
111 For example, see the following instructive blog post about the situation of migrant children at US borders: D.J. 
Cantor, “Gangs: The Real ‘Humanitarian Crisis’ driving Central American Children to the US”, The 
Conversation, 22 Aug. 2014, available at: http://theconversation.com/gangs-the-real-humanitarian-crisis-driving-
central-american-children-to-the-us-30672 (last visited 24 Aug. 2015). See also D.J. Cantor, “The New Wave: 
Forced Displacement Caused by Organized Crime in Central America and Mexico”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 
33(3), 2014, 34–68 
112 Advisory Opinion OC-21, above footnote 7, at para. 29. 
 18 
 
3.3. A continuous development: the emphasis on the recognition of the vulnerability of 
irregular immigrants 
The IACtHR has continued to develop its jurisprudence in line with a human rights-based 
approach to immigration, notably via the recognition of the condition of vulnerability of 
irregular immigrants.  
The IACtHR is not the only Court to recognize that immigrants and asylum-seekers are 
subjected to conditions of extreme vulnerability.113 The ECtHR has also recognized the 
vulnerability of aliens, as discussed below. However, it is suggested that the IACtHR seeks to 
promote an extended form of protection of vulnerable immigrants based on the expansion of 
the grounds of non-discrimination, in line with its Advisory Opinion OC-18. 
In the case of Velez Loor v. Panama,114 the IACtHR built on the argument put forward by 
Advisory Opinion OC-18, according to which undocumented immigrants should be considered 
as a “group in a vulnerable situation”.115 In this case, the IACtHR affirmed that this 
qualification is appropriate as irregular immigrants are “vulnerable to potential or actual 
violations of their rights and, as a result of their situation, they suffer a significant lack of 
protection of their rights”.116 The IACtHR reiterated this position in the case of Pacheco Tineo 
v. Bolivia,117 relating to the deportation of asylum-seekers, and the case of Dozerma v. 
Dominican Republic,118 relating to the treatment of Haitian citizens in an irregular situation in 
the Dominican Republic and the protection of their rights. In Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 
the IACtHR also observed the “particularly vulnerable situation of Dominican children of 
Haitian origin” and urged the State to take this into consideration when establishing the 
requirements for late registration of birth.119 In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR has 
extended even further the concept of vulnerability, affirming that migrant children may find 
                                                          
113 Recognition of the vulnerability of irregular immigrants was also at stake on a recent UK Supreme Court 
(UKSC) case Hounga v. Allen and another [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] WLR (D) 353. In this case, the UKSC 
decided that a victim of trafficking can claim compensation on the grounds of non-discrimination statutory 
provisions, despite having illegally entered the UK. The vulnerability of the applicant, a 14-year-old girl who was 
brought to England in order to work illegally as a sort of au pair in conditions amounting to forced labour, was 
emphasized by the majority. 
114 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9. See notably (for a comprehensive analysis of the main findings of the 
case) G. de Leon, “Contributions and Challenges for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the Protection 
of Migrants’ Rights: The Case of Velez Loor v. Panama”, Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, 
2, 2014, 39–53. 
115 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 114. 
116 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at para. 98. 
117 Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia, above footnote 29 at para. 128. 
118 Dozerma v. Dominican Republic, above footnote 7, at para. 152. 
119 Bosico v. Dominican Republic (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (8 Sep. 2005) at para. 240. 
themselves in a “situation of additional vulnerability”120 as they are at the same time migrants 
and children and for this reason doubly vulnerable. 
The ECtHR also takes into account the vulnerability of irregular immigrants. For instance, 
in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta, relating to the conditions of detention of asylum-seekers 
and irregular immigrants in Malta, the Court expressly considered “that the applicant was in a 
vulnerable position, not only because of the fact she was an irregular immigrant and because 
of her specific past and her personal circumstances, but also because of her fragile health”.121 
In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium,122 the ECtHR also 
highlighted the particular situation of “extreme vulnerability” of unaccompanied children. 123 
In addition, in Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,124 the ECtHR underlined the vulnerability of 
the applicants while assessing the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to the risk of 
arbitrary repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea.125 Therefore, the vulnerability of the irregular 
immigrant’s situation seems to be considered by the ECtHR as one of the criteria allowing for 
the interpretation of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR (provision prohibiting torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatments or punishments).126 In Siliadin v. France, 127 a case 
concerning modern slavery, the ECtHR also insisted on the vulnerability of the victim while 
examining the existence of a violation of Article 4 of the ECHR (provision prohibiting slavery 
and forced labour). In a slightly different context, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR 
accentuated that asylum-seekers (and not all irregular immigrants) form “a particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection”.128 The 
                                                          
120 Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in need of International Protection, 
Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (19 Aug. 2014) at para. 71. 
121 Aden Ahmed v. Malta App no. 55352/12 (ECHR, 23 Jul. 2013). 
122 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium App no. 13178/03 (ECHR, 12 Oct. 2006) at paras. 53–
55. 
123 Ibid., at para. 55. 
124 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy App no. 27765/09 (ECHR, 23 Feb. 2012) at para. 155. 
125 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque went even further and qualified irregular immigrants in general as “especially 
vulnerable persons” in his concurring opinion to this case: Ibid., (Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque) at para. 77. 
126 According to well-established case law, the European Court considers that “ill-treatment must attain a 
minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 ECHR. The assessment of this minimum is, 
in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.” 
Ireland v. UK App no. 5310/71 (ECHR, 18 Jan. 1978) at para. 162. 
127 Siliadin v. France App no. 73316/01 (ECHR, 26 Jul. 2005) at para. 126: the European Court emphasized that 
“as a minor, she (the victim) had no resources and was vulnerable and isolated, and had no means of living 
elsewhere than in the home of Mr and Mrs B., where she shared the children's bedroom as no other accommodation 
had been offered. She was entirely at Mr and Mrs B.’s mercy, since her papers had been confiscated and she had 
been promised that her immigration status would be regularised, which had never occurred”. 
128 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece App no. 30696/09 (ECHR, 21 Jan. 2011) at para. 251; M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece App no. 30696/09 (ECHR, 21 Jan. 2011) (Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajó) 
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decisions adopted in Tarakhel v. Switzerland129 and V. M. and others v. Belgium130 in 2014 and 
2015, respectively, confirmed the main findings put forward by the ECtHR in the M.S.S. case, 
stressing the vulnerability of the situation of asylum-seekers in Europe. Accordingly, the 
ECtHR’s approach generally corresponds to the position taken by the IACtHR.  
However, besides recognizing the vulnerability of irregular immigrants, the IACtHR has 
also drawn the necessary conclusions relating to their precise situation. It considered that the 
position of vulnerability may lead to impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations, 
as irregular immigrants would be less inclined to seek police protection or judicial remedy for 
fear of being arrested and removed from the host country.131 The IACtHR considered that “the 
legal and factual obstacles that make real access to justice illusory”132 and, together with 
cultural factors and the power structure in the society, contribute to the reinforcement of this 
sense of impunity.133  
Therefore, the IACtHR seems to find the need to reinforce the affirmation that human rights, 
and notably due-process guarantees, also apply to irregular immigrants.134 In this respect, the 
IACtHR clearly affirmed that States can take action against migrants who do not abide by the 
domestic immigration rules; 135 however, “upon adopting the relevant measures, States should 
respect human rights and guarantee their exercise and enjoyment to all persons who are within 
their territory, without discrimination based on their regular or irregular status, or their 
nationality, race, gender or any other reason”.136  
As a consequence, in contrast to the ECtHR’s position analysed above, the IACtHR seems 
more inclined to promote an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights, based 
                                                          
at para. 100 (in which he expresses his disapproval concerning the categorization of asylum-seekers as a 
vulnerable group of people). See also G. Clayton, “Asylum Seekers in Europe: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece”, 
Human Rights Law Review, 11(4), 2011, 758–773, at 769. 
129 Tarakhel v. Switzerland App no. 29217/12 (ECHR, 4 Nov. 2014) at paras. 99 and 118.  
130 V.M. and others v. Belgium App no. 60125/11 (ECHR, 7 Jul. 2015) at paras. 137–138 and 162. 
131 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at para. 98. 
132 Ibid.; Dozerma v. Dominican Republic, above footnote 7, at para. 153. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 121. 
135 Comparatively, the ECtHR has adopted a position according to which “[c]ontracting States have the right, as 
a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations including the Convention, to 
control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens”: Chahal v. UK, above footnote 78, at para. 73; Saadi v. UK, 
above footnote 78, at para. 44; Suso Musa v. Malta , above footnote 78, at para. 90. States are, however, bound to 
“secure to everyone within their jurisdiction”135 the rights and freedoms provided by the ECHR (Art. 1 ECHR). 
This includes aliens that can be found within the State parties’ jurisdiction. See Soering v. UK App no. 14038/88 
(ECHR, 7 Jul. 1989) at para. 86. For the interpretation of art. 1 ECHR see e.g. Ilascu and others v. Moldova and 
Russia App no. 48787/99 (ECHR, 8 Jul. 2004) at para. 311. 
136 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at para. 100 (emphasis added). 
on the enlarged application of the principle of equality and non-discrimination.137 The IACtHR 
added a new ground for non-discrimination based on the migratory status of the individual. By 
doing so, the IACtHR upheld and implemented the main argument put forward by Advisory 
Opinion OC-18.138 This implementation is also complemented by the imposition of a variety 
of obligations upon States. 
3.4. An ambitious destination: the imposition of a diverse range of obligations upon States 
The IACtHR has placed itself at the forefront of the recognition of a diverse range of 
obligations upon States in the field of irregular immigrants’ rights. The Court’s approach is 
certainly original. As Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has persuasively argued, “the Inter-
American approach to reparations is, to say the least, innovative and forward looking”.139 It is 
submitted that this unconventional approach is even more noteworthy in comparison with the 
one adopted by the ECtHR in similar cases. In general, remedies imposed by the IACtHR have 
been classified in 13 different groups:  
1) monetary economic compensation;  
2) non-monetary economic compensation;  
3) symbolic reparations;  
4) restitution of rights;  
5) prevention through training public officials;  
6) prevention through raising social awareness;  
7) prevention through legal reforms;  
8) prevention through strengthening, creating, or reforming public institutions; 
9) prevention through unspecified measures;  
10) investigation and punishment with legal reform;  
11) investigation and punishment without legal reform;  
                                                          
137 Comparatively, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is based on the general obligation to secure the protection of human 
rights without discrimination arising purely from conventional obligations relating to articles 1 and 14 of the 
ECHR (Article 14 guarantees equal treatment in the enjoyment of the other rights provided for by the ECHR). 
See S. Besson, “Evolutions in Non-Discrimination Law within the ECHR and the ESC Systems: ‘It Takes Two 
to Tango in the Council of Europe’”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 60(1), 2012,147–180; M. Cartabia, 
“The European Court of Human Rights: judging non-discrimination”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, 9(3–4), 2011, 808–814; F. Sudre & H. Surrel (eds) Le droit à la non-discrimination au sens de la Convention 
Européene des Droits de l’Homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2008. See also Bah v. UK App no. 56328/07 (ECHR, 27 
Sep. 2011) at para. 37; Gaygusuz v. Austria App no. 17371/90 (ECHR, 16 Sep. 1996) at para. 42 (both decisions 
stressing that a difference of treatment based exclusively on the the grounds of nationality or sex would be more 
difficult to justify). 
138 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6, at para. 
139 L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 35, at 224. 
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12) protection of victims and witnesses; and  
13) other.140 
In the specific field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights, the IACtHR goes 
further than its European counterpart in imposing, for example, that the State: 
[M]ust implement, in a reasonable period of time, a formation and training program that 
deals with international standards related to the human rights of migrants, due process 
guarantees, and the right to consular assistance for the personnel of the National 
Migration and Naturalization Service, as well as for officials that given their jurisdiction 
in the matter, handle issues related to migrant persons.141 
Another common feature of the Inter-American case law is to impose on States the obligation 
to perform a “public act of acknowledgment of international responsibility and public 
apology”.142 Practical actions, such as imposing that “the State must organize a media 
campaign on the rights of regular and irregular migrants”,143 may also be required. Similarly, 
there may be the imposition of symbolic measures, such as building memorials in honour of 
the victims,144 and the organization of a public ceremony broadcast by the national television 
network.145 More controversial is the fact that the IACtHR can also order that a “State must, 
within a reasonable time, adapt its domestic laws”.146 It is submitted that this type of measure 
can be seen as a disproportionate interference in domestic affairs, although Articles 1(1)147 and 
                                                          
140 F. Basch, L. Filippini, A. Laya, M. Nino, F. Rossi & B. Schreiber, “The Effectiveness of the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with its 
Decisions”, SUR International Journal of Human Rights, 12, 2010, 8–36, at 12–14.  
141 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at operative para. 16.  
142 Dozerma v. Dominican Republic, above footnote 7, at operative para. 6. 
143 Ibid., at operative para. 8.  
144 Villagran Morales and others v. Guatemala Reparations) Inter-American Court of Human Rights (26 May 
2001) (“Street Children Case”) at operative para. 7. 
145 Gonzalez and others v. Mexico “Cotton Field Case” (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (16 Nov. 2009) at para. 469. 
146 Ibid., at operative para. 9. 
147 Article 1(1) ACHR: “1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights 
and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.” 
2 of the ACHR148 are interpreted by the IACtHR as entailing a general obligation of States to 
adapt their domestic legislation to the ACHR.149  
It is argued that all these measures of satisfaction seem to be connected to a broader point: 
the acknowledgement of the victims’ suffering.150 The explicit recognition of the violation of 
victims’ rights and of their suffering can be seen as a powerful form of reparation in the context 
of severe impunity reigning in Latin America. Some of the actions imposed on States also have 
the goal of educating civil servants and governmental agents for the future. In addition, the 
recognition by the IACtHR of new categories of harm, such as the damage to the “life project” 
of the victim,151 reinforces the relevance of the imposition of different forms of reparation. The 
IACtHR also allows specific reparations to be awarded not only to direct victims of violations 
but also to groups, considered as collective beneficiaries.152 Irregular immigrants are 
considered by the IACtHR as a vulnerable group,153 which is certainly at the origin of the 
imposition of forms of reparation benefiting the whole group of existent and future irregular 
immigrants, such as the obligation to organize and run specific training for civil servants 
working with immigrants.154 
These forms of reparations are justified in law. As the IACtHR has stated, “it is a principle 
of international law that all violations of an international obligation which cause damage must 
be adequately make reparations”.155 Reparations are “measures tending to eliminate the effects 
of the violations committed”.156 They are calculated in relation to the characteristics of the 
                                                          
148 Article 2 ACHR: “Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already 
ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.” 
149 Advisory Opinion OC-21, above footnote 7, at para. 65. See L. Lavrysen, “Positive Obligations in the 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, Inter-American and European Human Rights 
Journal, 2, 2014, 95–115, at 96–97; 
150 This is also the case in transitional justice at the international level, and restorative justice in some domestic 
legal orders such as in the UK; A. Ashworth, “Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice”, British Journal 
of Criminology, 42(3), 2002, 578–595; S. Winter, “Towards a Unified Theory of Transitional Justice”, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 7(2), 2013, 224–244; R. Uprimny & M.P. Saffon, “Transitional 
Justice, Restorative Justice and Reconciliation. Some Insights from the Colombian Case”, University of Wisconsin 
Working Paper Series, available at:  http://www.global.wisc.edu/reconciliation/library/papers_open/saffon.pdf 
(last visited 14 Jan. 2015); Ministry of Justice, Restorative Justice Action Plan for the Criminal Justice System 
(Nov. 2012), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217311/restorative-justice-action-
plan.pdf (last visited 14 Jan. 2015). 
151 Loaysa Tamayo v. Peru (Reparations and Costs) IACtHR (27 Nov. 1998).  
152 L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 36, at 227. 
153 Advisory Opinion OC-18, above footnote 6 at para. 114.  
154 See e.g. Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at operative para. 16. 
155 Gutiérrez-Soler v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACtHR (12 Sep. 2005) at para. 61. 
156 Ibid., at para. 64. 
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violation and correspond to the nature of the damage (pecuniary or non-pecuniary). Reparations 
arise from States’ obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, and also encompass 
guarantees of non-repetition.157 Reparations can take the form of restitutio in integrum or full 
restitution, which implies the return to the state of affairs prior to the infringement.158 However, 
in the large majority of cases and as a consequence of the nature of violations, per se, full 
restitution is not always possible or feasible.159 Accordingly, international courts can order 
other forms of reparation. For instance, the ECtHR can impose measures of just satisfaction.160 
The IACtHR can also impose these types of remedies. However, its powers go beyond the 
European model as it may order a more diversified range of reparations. 
Comparatively, the ECtHR can be seen as more conservative; it does not normally impose 
measures of this sort. Financial compensation is the main tool that the ECtHR utilizes when 
seeking to impose reparations. However, through the development of the doctrine of positive 
obligations,161 the ECtHR can decide in concreto whether States have undertaken all the 
appropriate substantive and procedural measures in order to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights obligations. In doing so, the ECtHR is able to impose rather intrusive measures upon 
States, including the obligation to provide material conditions to the reception of asylum-
seekers once there is a legal basis for such an obligation in domestic law.162 Nonetheless, in the 
field of the protection of immigrants’ rights, the ECtHR does not seem inclined to use the 
doctrine of positive obligations to impose a general positive obligation to protect human rights 
upon States.163  
                                                          
157 Ibid., at para. 63 (“the positive measures that the State must adopt to prevent repetition of the harmful events”). 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Art. 41 ECHR provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, 
the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” Just satisfaction is not automatically 
imposed every time the European Court finds that a contracting State has violated conventional rights. On the 
contrary, the European Court has a certain leeway to determine whether another form of reparation is necessary 
because it is just (équitable in the French version of the text). Just satisfaction may be granted on the grounds of 
pecuniary damage, non-pecuniary damage, and costs and expenses. Compensation for pecuniary damage can 
relate to the loss already suffered (damnum emergens) and the loss of reasonably expected gains (lucrum cessans). 
Compensation for non-pecuniary damage normally involves the determination of the payment of a sum of money 
by the State, although the Court may establish that just satisfaction is attained by the mere declaration of violation 
of rights. 
161 A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by 
the European Court of Human Rights, London, Hart Publishing, 2004. 
162 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, above footnote 127, at para. 250; Tarakhel v. Switzerland, above footnote 128, 
at 96; V.M. and others v. Belgium, above footnote 129, at para. 136. 
163 In the Chamber decision Sisojeva and others v. Latvia App no. 60654/00 (ECHR, 16 Jun. 2005) at para. 104, 
the European Court seemed to suggest that positive obligations could be imposed upon States in the context of 
the right to the protection of family life of a foreigner facing deportation, contradicting the Court’s traditional 
approach in the field. See J-F. Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Ultimately, it is submitted that the IACtHR imposes stronger obligations upon its Member 
States in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. The root of this different 
approach may lie in the particularities of the Latin American societal context. Trivialization of 
violence and a widespread feeling of impunity are common features in many Latin American 
countries. This is a terrible scourge which young Latin American democracies are still 
facing.164 Undoubtedly, this is reflected in the IACtHR’s case law. This Court has dealt, for 
example, with violent massacres of indigenous populations,165 kidnapping, torture and murder 
of street children by police officers,166 forced disappearance,167 and, in what directly relates to 
this article’s subject, violent and unlawful killing of irregular immigrants and potential asylum-
seekers.168 Extreme poverty, organized crime and the development of a gang culture certainly 
do not help to secure respect for human rights in the region. Presumably, the IACtHR’s 
response to violations of human rights in this societal context needs to be robust. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Burgorgue-Larsen and Ubeda de Torres, the IACtHR’s approach to reparations 
“can be summed up in just five words: exceptional crimes justify exceptional reparations”.169 
In comparison to the ECtHR, the Inter-American case law on reparations appears to be far more 
aggressive; it may, however, suffer to a greater extent from problems linked to its judicial 
authority and to compliance. 
 
4. A contribution partially eroded by legal, institutional and societal limitations 
 
The IACtHR has certainly developed an important jurisprudence aimed at imposing an 
extended form of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. However, it is still necessary to 
                                                          
Rights, Human Rights Handbooks no. 7, Council of Europe, 2007, at 40. However, the Chamber decision was 
later overturned by the Grand Chamber in Sisojeva and others v. Latvia App no. 60654/00 (ECHR, 15 Jan. 2007) 
which does not mention the possibility of imposing positive obligations on States in this domain. See M-B. 
Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants, above footnote 3, at 459–464. But see M-B. Dembour, When Humans 
Become Migrants, above footnote 3, at 112 (discussing the possibility of imposition of positive obligations upon 
States in the ambit of Article 8 ECHR in relation to admission into their territory of relatives of settled 
immigrants). 
164 See F. Lessa et al., “Overcoming Impunity: Pathways to Accountability in Latin America”, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 8, 2014) 75–98; J. Pasqualucci, above footnote 44.  
165 Moiwana Community v. Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR (15 Jun. 
2005).  
166 Street Children Case, above footnote 143. 
167 Goiburu v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACtHR (33 Sep. 2006). 
168 Dozerma v. Dominican Republic, above footnote 7. 
169 L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 35, at 224. 
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analyse whether this protection can be considered effective and efficient. It is submitted that 
the imposition of a variety of obligations upon States is not sufficient to eliminate limitations 
imposed by State practice. It follows that legal and institutional limitations may still restrain 
the full application of the Inter-American jurisprudence in this field. Three main limitations 
can be identified: restricted membership of the ACHR; inadequacy of compliance with the 
IACtHR’s decisions; and circumscribed effectiveness of human rights in the Americas. 
4.1. Limited membership of the ACHR 
Limited membership is undoubtedly one of the main problems faced by the Inter-American 
system as a whole, which naturally, limits the scope of recognition and implementation of 
irregular immigrants’ rights.  
The fact that Canada and the US, the two wealthiest States on the North American continent, 
refused to accede to the system may be seen as a tremendous handicap for the legitimacy of 
this regional system. The US signed the ACHR in 1977 but it has never ratified it. Canada 
refused to accede to the ACHR.170 In addition to the negative image it creates, not having these 
two North American countries on board also leads to a dramatic impact on the funding of the 
IACtHR and the Inter-American Commission. As Robert Goldman states, “the OAS is an 
organization in perpetual financial crisis”.171 Indeed, the vast majority of OAS members and 
the ACHR parties are developing countries. Therefore, funding the functioning of an 
international court with a reduced budget is a difficult juggling exercise.172 It has been 
submitted that “continuing financial limitations may be hampering the tribunal’s ability to 
achieve [its] goals”.173 The IACtHR may certainly face difficulties in providing great service 
as it has a limited number of attorneys to be instructed on cases, and it lacks permanent staff. 
                                                          
170 See the OAS website for information on membership of the ACHR, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited 14 Jan. 
2015). 
171 Goldman, above footnote 11, at 883. 
172 By way of comparison, the IACtHR’s budget for 2014 amounts to 2,661,100 US dollars according to the 
OAS 2014 budget: 2013 Budget, 10, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/budget/2014/Budget%202014%20Eng%20V2.%20Final.pdf (last visited 14 Jan. 2015). The 
ECtHR’s budget for 2014 amounts to 67,650,400 euros according to information available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/howitworks&c=#newComponent_1346157778000_pointer 
(last visited 14 Jan. 2015).  
173 J. Cavallaro & S. Brewer, “Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Case of the Inter-American Court”, American Journal of International Law, 102(4), 2008, 768–827, at 795. 
The situation is even more complex in the context of an expanded workload due to an increased 
number of communications referred by the Inter-American Commission.174 
In addition, partial membership of the ACHR creates a sort of à la carte system, opposed to 
the universality of human rights claimed by international bodies.175 As pointed out by Jo 
Pasqualucci, “lack of universality complicates the functioning of the Inter-American 
Commission, which must apply somewhat different criteria depending on whether a State is or 
is not a party to the American Convention”.176 This is certainly also the case of the IACtHR, 
as the recourse to the concept of jus cogens in Advisory Opinion OC-18 confirms. Furthermore, 
the lack of universality indicated above may lead to a double standard of protection of human 
rights in the Americas. It can be argued that human rights would not be protected in the same 
manner all over the region, as some countries are not party to the Convention.177 This risk 
should, however, be counterbalanced by the fact that some of the States that are not party to 
the ACHR have their own domestic instruments of human rights protection.178 These 
instruments are, in general, inspired by the UDHR, which has acquired the status of customary 
international law.179 
 
 
4.2. Inadequate or partial compliance with the IACtHR’s decisions 
Another crucial limitation to the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights established by the 
IACtHR’s jurisprudence relates to the lack of full State compliance with the Court’s decisions.  
                                                          
174 For example, in 2013 the Inter-American Commission referred 11 cases to the IACtHR (Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2013, ch. 1, Point C, at para. 40). This is considered an increase 
in the workload of the Court compared with previous years. For example, in the period 1979–1986 the IACtHR 
did not refer a single case to the IACtHR: L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 35, at 37. 
175 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
on 25 Jun. 1993, I, 5. 
176 J. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge, CUP, 
2013, at 26. 
177 See the OAS website for information on membership of the ACHR, available at: 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited 14 Jan. 
2015). 
178 Canadian Human Rights Act (RSC 1985, c H-6); US Bill of Rights (US Const. amend. I-X) and US Const 
amend XI-XXVII.  
179 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3, at para. 42. See H. Hannum, “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 25, 1995–1996, 287; J. Von 
Bernstorf, “The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic 
Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law”, European Journal of International Law, 19(5), 2008, 
903–924, at 913. 
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Compliance may be understood as “a causal relationship between the contents of judicial 
decisions and State practice, leading to a convergence of the two”.180 According to Article 
68(1) of the ACHR: “The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties”. States are thus required to 
implement the measures imposed by the IACtHR; however, in reality, they fail to comply or 
only comply partially with the IACtHR’s decisions.  
It is suggested that compliance is inadequate in Latin America for three main reasons: the 
imposition of a far too vast a range of measures of reparations upon States, the lack of an 
independent monitoring body, and the attitude of States in practice.  
First, imposing a wide range of measures of reparations is certainly necessary and beneficial 
to the victims of human rights violations. As examined above, these measures may encompass 
not only financial compensation but also structural and symbolic actions.181 Yet, the imposition 
of such measures alone may not be sufficient. Structural measures may be more lengthy and 
difficult to implement. Changes in domestic legislation may be in many cases dependent on 
internal strategies and political will. Furthermore, account should be taken of the economic and 
financial situation of Latin American States. Some States may feel less inclined to comply with 
obligations that directly interfere with their domestic budgetary plans, such as the construction 
of memorials for victims of massacres, or the introduction of new training programmes for civil 
servants.182 On a spectrum, it seems that States are more inclined to comply with the obligation 
to pay financial compensation to victims, but less inclined to provide for the more forceful 
measures imposed.183 
For instance, in the Velez Loor case, concerning the detention of irregular immigrants, the 
IACtHR ordered Panama to pay compensatory indemnities within a period of six months, 
publish the judgment in national media, carry out criminal investigations, adopt measures to 
create establishments for the purposes of detention of irregular immigrants, implement an 
education and training programme on the human rights of immigrants, and implement training 
programmes on the obligation to initiate ex officio investigations.184 Panama has not yet fully 
                                                          
180 Y. Shany, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach”, American Journal 
of International Law, 106(2), 2012, 225–270, at 261. 
181 See above Section 3.4. 
182 F. Basch, L. Filippini, A. Laya, M. Nino, F. Rossi & B. Schreiber, above footnote 139, at Chart no. 5. 
183 L. Burgorgue-Larsen & A. Ubeda de Torres, above footnote 36, at 184. 
184 Velez Loor v. Panama, above footnote 9, at operative paras 12–18. 
complied with the Court’s orders.185 In this case, the IACtHR insisted that the State should 
adopt measures to ensure that detention facilities should be “adapted to migrants, staffed by 
duly trained and qualified civilian personnel” in order to ensure that migrants would not be 
detained together with ordinary criminals.186 This measure was ordered to ensure non-
repetition of human rights violations. In 2013, only two detention centres had been established 
and the country had not given clear indications as to its compliance with the specific measures 
regarding adequacy of detention facilities and training of civil servants.187 
Similarly, in Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the IACtHR imposed a significant range of 
measures upon the State, including the organization of a “public act acknowledging its 
international responsibility and apologizing to the victims”, and the adoption of “legislative, 
administrative and any other measures needed to regulate the procedure and requirements for 
acquiring Dominican nationality based on late declaration of birth”188 The State has not yet 
complied with these two measures and it seems that there is no political will to fully implement 
them domestically.189  
Second, unlike the European system, in which the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe has the explicit competence to monitor the execution of the ECtHR’s decisions,190 
the ACHR does not establish a specific body to monitor compliance with the IACtHR’s 
decisions. Despite the fact that the IACtHR recognized its own competence to monitor 
compliance with its decisions in the case of Baena Ricardo, this mechanism is not optimal.191 
The Court established a twofold mechanism: it encompasses a first stage in which the State 
submits a report to the Court; this is then followed by the Court’s assessment of the State’s 
engagements and progress in the field. Accordingly, this is mainly a judicial mechanism, as 
opposed to the political mechanism in place in the European system. Therefore, there is little 
place for political pressure in the Inter-American system, as the OAS General Assembly 
receives but does not analyse in depth the annual reports submitted by the IACtHR. As pointed 
out by Jo Pasqualucci, the General Assembly has never issued a comment on State non-
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compliance with Court judgments.192 The IACtHR is thus responsible for imposing obligations 
upon States and for monitoring States’ compliance with its own decisions. This can be 
challenging, particularly insofar as the IACtHR has a very limited budget193 and cannot afford 
to have an extended team of attorneys to help with the analysis of country reports. For instance, 
in Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia, relating to the expulsion of former refugees who have entered the 
country illegally, the Court imposed several measures of reparation, including specific training 
for civil servants.194 The State has complied with one financial measure imposed, but the Court 
has not yet monitored compliance with any other specific measure, including the one relating 
to training of civil servants.195 
Third, it is submitted that States do not always make the necessary efforts to comply with 
the IACtHR’s decisions in practice. As observed by Cavallaro and Brewer: “Governments may 
openly reject certain orders, but even more commonly they assert that they will comply or are 
in the process of complying, yet fail to take the steps necessary to bring their practices into line 
with the requirements of the Court’s judgment”.196 This seems to be the case in relation to 
measures adopted in the context of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. For instance, 
Panama has not fully complied with the totality of measures imposed by the IACtHR in the 
Velez Loor case.197 Similarly, the Dominican Republic has yet to comply with the totality of 
measures imposed by the IACtHR in the Bosico case, which was already 10 years ago.198 
Although, as Hawkins and Jacoby have persuasively argued, “international rules display some 
degree of effectiveness even when compliance is low (by inducing behavioural changes)”,199 
the attitude of Latin American political elites is still not fully satisfactory. They may indeed 
consider respect for human rights as a powerful tool to promote their image and reputation in 
the international arena.200 Panama, for instance, fiercely presented a list of efforts made by its 
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government in the field of immigration to the United Nations Human Rights Council201on the 
occasion of its Universal Periodical Review,202 in 2010.203 Likewise, the Dominican Republic 
depicted a fairly positive picture of the situation vis-à-vis the protection of migrants’ rights in 
its national report presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013.204 Yet, none 
of these countries have fully complied with important measures imposed by the IACtHR in 
these very same areas.205  
Lack of full compliance with the IACtHR’s orders may also reinforce the feeling of 
impunity within many Latin American countries, and hinder the effectiveness of the ambitious 
form of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights established by the IACtHR.  
4.3. Circumscribed effectiveness of human rights protection in Latin America 
Effectiveness of the protection of human rights is another great challenge faced by Latin 
American countries. It is argued that the inadequacy of the protection of human rights, 
including those of irregular immigrants, is largely related to the general culture of improbity 
and corruption prevalent in Latin America.206  
First, it is important to note that some of the Latin American countries have only re-
established democratic processes very recently.207 As a consequence, the culture of corruption 
and improbity flows from those years of dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. A deep societal 
change is thus needed. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), charities and human rights 
defenders should all be involved in the process. Civil society should be involved in a multilevel 
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process of promotion of human rights values. Cavallaro and Brewer’s viewpoint is of great 
assistance in this matter. They submit that advances in human rights practices in the majority 
of Latin American countries have historically depended on the ability of social movements and 
human rights advocates on the ground to exert pressure on authorities to implement change.208 
As one of the possible solutions, they advocate that the Court should be more concerned with 
“maximizing the relevance and implementability of its jurisprudence”,209 notably by making it 
more accessible to the public and also more in touch with the social context of the countries to 
which it is addressed. This is certainly the direction in which the IACtHR’s case law should 
evolve, notably in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. 
Second, it is necessary to take into account the considerable gap between law and practice 
often present in certain Latin American countries. Despite the adoption of comprehensive 
constitutions, expressly recognizing human rights,210 the protection of these rights is not fully 
effective in practice. The Brazilian Constitution, for instance, proclaims an extensive catalogue 
of rights, encompassing civil and political rights, as well as economic and social rights.211 This 
does not mean that in practice these fundamental rights are effectively guaranteed. For 
example, Article 5 (XLIX) states that “prisoners are ensured respect for their physical and 
moral integrity”.212 However, the reality of detention conditions in several Brazilian prisons 
shows that prisoners’ physical and moral integrity are not effectively protected. In relation to 
migration detention, Law No. 6.815/1980 sets out the provisions for the imprisonment of 
foreigners for reasons of irregular immigration.213 There are currently no detention centres or 
dedicated facilities for foreigners available in Brazilian territory. Irregular immigrants are thus 
detained in ordinary prisons, together with all sorts of criminals. Prisons in Brazil are well 
known for their undignified and overcrowded facilities.214 Accordingly, common prisoners and 
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detained migrants alike are subjected, in practice, to a situation that is certainly not in line with 
either the Brazilian constitution, or the ACHR.215  
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the protection of irregular immigrants’ human rights, is 
undoubtedly a major challenge for Latin American countries.  
5. Conclusion 
This article has shown that the IACtHR has the potential to promote a sustained form of 
protection of irregular immigrants’ rights in Latin America. It has also been demonstrated that 
the IACtHR has extended its human rights-based approach to the protection of irregular 
immigrants’ rights.  
Its jurisprudence has developed in line with its landmark Advisory Opinion OC-18 handed 
down in 2003. This article has also suggested that principles developed by the Inter-American 
jurisprudence can have an impact, although modest, outside the Latin American sphere.216 The 
IACtHR’s proactive interpretation of sources of international law217 has moderately influenced 
judicial authorities, practitioners and academics within and outside its jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, this article has demonstrated that the IACtHR’s analysis of legal concepts at the 
basis of its dynamic jurisprudence is not immune from criticism. Its interpretation of the legal 
effects of peremptory norms of international law, and the qualification of non-discrimination 
on the grounds of origin or nationality as a norm of jus cogens, is not free from significant 
errors. Yet, it has given the IACtHR the opportunity to build upon its own jurisprudence and 
promote a far-reaching system of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights, focused on their 
vulnerability and imposing important obligations upon States. 
However, it is submitted that the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights proposed by the 
IACtHR suffers from certain inefficiencies. This protection is indeed highly dependent on Latin 
American countries’ capability to overcome several important challenges, in particular with 
respect to their compliance with judicial decisions and the effectiveness of measures to protect 
the human rights of irregular immigrants. These challenges are not only purely legal or 
institutional but are also strongly dependent on cultural, political and societal issues. The Latin 
American socio-economic context cannot be disassociated from State practice in the field of 
protection of irregular immigrants’ rights. Endemic corruption, organized crime, and pervasive 
                                                          
215 Notably article 5 ACHR (right to humane treatment). 
216 See above section 3.2. 
217 H. Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2014, at 154. 
 34 
 
gang culture cannot be isolated from the broader panorama of human rights protection in Latin 
America. In the specific field of immigration, these elements can serve at the same time as 
drivers of migration218 and barriers to the effective implementation of immigrants’ rights 
protection.  
The comparison of the IACtHR with its European counterpart has shown that the Costa 
Rica-based institution has certainly many areas in which to improve. Compliance with its 
decisions and the effectiveness of the measures it takes to protect rights are the issues of main 
concern. However, its forward-looking jurisprudence in the field of the protection of irregular 
immigrants’ rights may also serve as a guide to the European judges, notably in relation to 
irregular immigrant workers’ rights and migrant children’s rights.219  
Overall, the ambitious system of protection of irregular immigrants’ rights designed by the 
IACtHR finds itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, the Court should continue to 
establish its authority and impose necessary sets of obligations upon States, thereby elevating 
the level of protection of human rights in the continent; on the other hand, however, the Court 
should take into account the reality of the protection of human rights in Latin America, and act 
even more firmly on instances relating to non-compliance with its decisions by States.  
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